One of the greatest hindrances to the clear understanding, the incisive statement, and the true solution of legal problems, frequently arises from the express or tacit assumption that all legal relations may be reduced to “rights” and “duties,” and that these latter categories are therefore adequate for the purpose of analyzing even the most complex legal interests, such as trusts, options, escrows, “future” interests, corporate interests, etc. Even if the difficulty related merely to inadequacy and ambiguity of terminology, its seriousness would nevertheless be worthy of definite recognition and persistent effort toward improvement; for in any closely reasoned problem, whether legal or non-legal, chameleon-hued words are a peril both to clear thought and to lucid expression. As a matter of fact, however, the above mentioned inadequacy and ambiguity of terms unfortunately reflect, all too often, corresponding paucity and confusion as regards actual legal conceptions. ...

The strictly fundamental legal relations are, after all, *sui generis*; and thus it is that attempts at formal definition are always unsatisfactory, if not altogether useless. Accordingly, the most promising line of procedure seems to consist in exhibiting all of the various relations in a scheme of “opposites” and “correlatives,” and then proceeding to exemplify their individual scope and application in concrete cases. An effort will be made to pursue this method:

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Jural</th>
<th>rights</th>
<th>privilege</th>
<th>power</th>
<th>immunity</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Opposites</td>
<td>no-rights</td>
<td>duty</td>
<td>disability</td>
<td>liability</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Jural</td>
<td>right</td>
<td>privilege</td>
<td>power</td>
<td>immunity</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Correlatives</td>
<td>duty</td>
<td>no-right</td>
<td>liability</td>
<td>disability</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

**Rights and Duties.** As already intimated, the term “rights” tends to be used indiscriminately to cover what in a given case may be a privilege, a power, or an immunity, rather than a right in the strictest sense; and this looseness of usage is occasionally recognized by the authorities. ...

Recognizing, as we must, the very broad and indiscriminate use of the term, “right,” what clue do we find, in ordinary legal discourse, toward limiting the word in question to a definite and appropriate meaning. That clue lies in the correlative “duty,” for it is certain that even those who use the word and the conception “right” in the broadest possible way are accustomed to thinking of “duty” as the invariable correlative. ...

In other words, if X has a right against Y that he shall stay off the former’s land, the correlative (and equivalent) is that Y is under a duty toward X to stay off the place. If, as seems desirable, we should seek a synonym for the term “right” in this limited and proper meaning, perhaps the word “claim” would prove the best. ...

**Privileges and “No-Rights.”** As indicated in the above scheme of jural relations, a privilege is the opposite of a duty, and the correlative of a “no-right.” In the example last put, whereas X has a
right or claim that Y, the other man, should stay off the land, he himself has the privilege of entering on the land; or, in equivalent words, X does not have a duty to stay off. The privilege of entering is the negation of a duty to stay off. As indicated by this case, some caution is necessary at this point, for, always, when it is said that a given privilege is the mere negation of a duty, what is meant, of course, is a duty having a content or tenor precisely opposite to that of the privilege in question. Thus, if, for some special reason, X has contracted with Y to go on the former’s own land, it is obvious that X has, as regards Y, both the privilege of entering and the duty of entering. The privilege is perfectly consistent with this sort of duty,—for the latter is of the same content or tenor as the privilege;—but it still holds good that, as regards Y, X’s privilege of entering is the precise negation of a duty to stay off. Similarly, if A has not contracted with B to perform certain work for the latter, A’s privilege of not doing so is the very negation of a duty of doing so. Here again the duty contrasted is of a content or tenor exactly opposite to that of the privilege.

Passing now to the question of “correlatives,” it will be remembered, of course, that a duty is the invariable correlative of that legal relation which is most properly called a right or claim. That being so, if further evidence be needed as to the fundamental and important difference between a right (or claim) and a privilege, surely it is found in the fact that the correlative of the latter relation is a “no-right,” there being no single term available to express the latter conception. Thus, the correlative of X’s right that Y shall not enter on the land is Y’s duty not to enter; but the correlative of X’s privilege of entering himself is manifestly Y’s “no-right” that X shall not enter.

In view of the considerations thus far emphasized, the importance of keeping the conception of a right (or claim) and the conception of a privilege quite distinct from each other seems evident; and more than that, it is equally clear that there should be a separate term to represent the latter relation. No doubt, as already indicated, it is very common to use the term “right” indiscriminately, even when the relation designated is really that of privilege; and only too often this identity of terms has involved for the particular speaker or writer a confusion or blurring of ideas. ...

A “liberty” considered as a legal relation (or “right” in the loose and generic sense of that term) must mean, if it have any definite content at all, precisely the same thing as privilege .... . It is equally clear, as already indicated, that ... a privilege or liberty to deal with others at will might very conceivably exist without any peculiar concomitant rights against “third parties” as regards certain kinds of interference. Whether there should be such concomitant rights (or claims) is ultimately a question of justice and policy; and it should be considered, as such, on its merits. The only correlative logically implied by the privileges or liberties in question are the “no-rights” of “third parties.” It would therefore be a non sequitur to conclude from the mere existence of such liberties that “third parties,” are under a duty not to interfere, etc. ...

Powers and Liabilities. As indicated in the preliminary scheme of jural relations, a legal power (as distinguished, of course, from a mental or physical power) is the opposite of legal disability, and the correlative of legal liability. But what is the intrinsic nature of a legal power as such? Is it possible to analyze the conception represented by this constantly employed and very important term of legal discourse? ...

A change in a given legal relation may result (1) from some superadded fact or group of facts not under the volitional control of a human being (or human beings); or (2) from some superadded fact
or group of facts which are under the volitional control of one or more human beings. As regards
the second class of cases, the person (or persons) whose volitional control is paramount may be
said to have the (legal) power to effect the particular change of legal relations that is involved in
the problem.

The second class of cases—powers in the technical sense—must now be further considered. The
nearest synonym for any ordinary case seems to be (legal) “ability,”—the latter being obviously
the opposite of “inability,” or “disability.” The term “right,” so frequently and loosely used in the
present connection, is an unfortunate term for the purpose,—a not unusual result being confusion
of thought as well as ambiguity of expression. ...

Many examples of legal powers may readily be given. Thus, X, the owner of ordinary personal
property “in a tangible object” has the power to extinguish his own legal interest (rights, powers,
immunities, etc.) through that totality of operative facts known as abandonment; and—
simultaneously and correlative—to create in other persons privileges and powers relating to the
abandoned object,—e.g., the power to acquire title to the latter by appropriating it. Similarly, X
has the power to transfer his interest to Y,—that is, to extinguish his own interest and
concomitantly create in Y a new and corresponding interest. So also X has the power to create
contractual obligations of various kinds. Agency cases are likewise instructive. ... The creation of
an agency relation involves, inter alia, the grant of legal powers to the so-called agent, and the
creation of correlative liabilities in the principal. That is to say, one party P has the power to create
agency powers in another party A,—for example, the power to convey X’s property, the power to
impose (so-called) contractual obligations on P, the power to discharge a debt, owing to P, the
power to “receive” title to property so that it shall vest in P, and so forth. ...

As regards all the “legal powers” thus far considered, possibly some caution is necessary. If, for
example, we consider the ordinary property owner’s power of alienation, it is necessary to
distinguish carefully between the legal power, the physical power to do the things necessary for
the “exercise” of the legal power, and, finally, the privilege of doing these things—that is, if such
privilege does really exist. It may or may not. Thus, if X, a landowner, has contracted with Y that
the former will not alienate to Z, the acts of X necessary to exercise the power of alienating to Z
are privileged as between X and every party other than Y; but, obviously, as between X and Y, the
former has no privilege of doing the necessary acts; or conversely, he is under a duty to Y not to
do what is necessary to exercise the power.

In view of what has already been said, very little may suffice concerning a liability as such. The
latter, as we have seen, is the correlative of power, and the opposite of immunity (or exemption).
While no doubt the term “liability” is often loosely used as a synonym for “duty,” or “obligation,”
it is believed, from an extensive survey of judicial precedents, that the connotation already adopted
as most appropriate to the word in question is fully justified. ...

[Consider, for example, an 1861] Virginia statute providing “that all free white male persons who
are twenty-one years of age and not over sixty, shall be liable to serve as jurors, except as
hereinafter provided.” It is plain that this enactment imposed only a liability and not a duty. It is a
liability to have a duty created. The latter would arise only when, in exercise of their powers, the
parties litigant and the court officers, had done what was necessary to impose a specific duty to perform the functions of a juror. ...

Immunities and Disabilities. As already brought out, immunity is the correlative of disability ("no-power"), and the opposite, or negation, of liability. Perhaps it will also be plain, from the preliminary outline and from the discussion down to this point, that a power bears the same general contrast to an immunity that a right does to a privilege. A right is one’s affirmative claim against another, and a privilege is one’s freedom from the right or claim of another. Similarly, a power is one’s affirmative “control” over a given legal relation as against another; whereas an immunity is one’s freedom from the legal power or “control” of another as regards some legal relation.

A few examples may serve to make this clear. X, a landowner, has, as we have seen, power to alienate to Y or to any other ordinary party. On the other hand, X has also various immunities as against Y, and all other ordinary parties. For Y is under a disability (i.e., has no power) so far as shifting the legal interest either to himself or to a third party is concerned; and what is true of Y applies similarly to every one else who has not by virtue of special operative facts acquired a power to alienate X’s property. If, indeed, a sheriff has been duly empowered by a writ of execution to sell X’s interest, that is a very different matter: correlative to such sheriff’s power would be the liability of X,—the very opposite of immunity (or exemption). It is elementary, too, that as against the sheriff, X might be immune or exempt in relation to certain parcels of property, and be liable as to others. Similarly, if an agent has been duly appointed by X to sell a given piece of property, then, as to the latter, X has, in relation to such agent, a liability rather than an immunity. ...

In the latter part of the preceding discussion, eight conceptions of the law have been analyzed and compared, in some detail, the purpose having been to exhibit not only their intrinsic meaning and scope, but also their relations to one another and the methods by which they are applied, in judicial reasoning, to the solution of concrete problems of litigation. Before concluding this branch of the discussion a general suggestion may be ventured as to the great practical importance of a clear appreciation of the distinctions and discriminations set forth. If a homely metaphor be permitted, these eight conceptions,—rights and duties, privileges and no-rights, powers and liabilities, immunities and disabilities,—seem to be what may be called “the lowest common denominators of the law.” Ten fractions (1–3, 2–5, etc.) may, superficially, seem so different from one another as to defy comparison. If, however, they are expressed in terms of their lowest common denominators 5–15, 6–15, etc.), comparison becomes easy, and fundamental similarity may be discovered. The same thing is of course true as regards the lowest generic conceptions to which any and all “legal quantities” may be reduced.

... In short, the deeper the analysis, the great[er] become one’s perception of fundamental unity and harmony in the law.